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INTRODUCTION
On February 3, 1758, the entire company of Captain Ebenezer Learned from
Massachusetts deserted their posts at a fort in Stillwater, New York. This desertion was
initiated by the men of the company but was led by their commander, Captain Ebenezer
Learned, who had returned from a furlough to find his men discouraged and demoralized.
They had received orders from the British commander of the garrison, Captain Philip
Skene, that they would have to remain on guard through the winter at Stillwater. Their
enlistments, however, were due to expire on February 2, 1758. Their captain attempted
to have his company released but Skene refused to bend. From the British perspective,
the colonial force had been recruited to protect the colonies from the French and those
enemy forces remained a threat. After discussing the commander's decision with his
men, Captain Learned directed his men to make snow shoes and hide them within banks
of snow until they could escape. The provincial officer led his company out of the fort,
under the cover of darkness, marching his men south. During the seven days it took to
reach Deerfield, Massachusetts, the company was lost for two days and many men
suffered from frostbite and hunger. Finally, one of the men realized that the creek
they
were following was near Deerfield. Captain Learned asked his men to trust
him one last
time. Knowing that some of the injured would not make the remainder of the march
on
their own and that the rest of his company had not the strength to help,
the commander
built a fire and went ahead for help. When he arrived, Learned was greeted
with
welcoming arms by the soldiers there and a relief column was sent
back for the others.
The deserters were greeted with a hero's welcome, allowed
to recover from their ordeal,
1
and sent home. The captain never left his men and the soldiers never lost faith in their
commander. 1
Why would a military officer agree to lead a desertion? And why would his men
trust he would listen to their problems and not punish them under the British Articles of
War? Was he simply a coward or did his decision reflect something different entirely?
And why would the receiving garrison help them upon their arrival? I believe this is an
extreme example of the new form of leadership that was developed under the provincial
system of military. The provincial armies comprised voluntary enlistments of men who
were family, friend and neighbor who worked together in an egalitarian society. These
armies required a new form of leadership that engendered trust necessary to promote
continued support within local communities. Without that trust, new enlistments could
not be counted on for future campaigns.
In A People 'sArmy at War, Fred Anderson goes a long way towards explaining
how the colonial forces ofNew England in the eighteenth century were different from
their British counterparts and how those differences helped precipitate a later conflict, the
American War of Independence. Anderson plausibly contends that New England's
cultural values, reflected in their military institution, clashed with English social
norms in
the interactions between soldiers during the Seven Years' War, resulting in a
realization
that colonials were no longer "English" but were "American". While his
method of
questioning the interpretation of military history from a social angle
is compelling and
fruitful, Anderson fails to adequately examine how the relationships between
officers and
i
Rafos Pataaiii M.mnirsnf Rufus Putnam, (Boston: Houton
Mifflin, 1903), p. 11.
FreHnderson. A^ep^e^Army. (Chapel Hill. The University of
North Carolma Press. 1984). p. 162-4.
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men, developed in an egalitarian society and a voluntary army, became a unique form of
leadership negotiated in a singular manner.
Fred Anderson understands the relationship between officers and their men, in
Massachusetts, to be a contractual arrangement that was mainly legalistic and economic
in nature. This insight explains much about the differences between the Massachusetts
soldiers and English soldiers. Yet contract as a concept explains little about the
maintenance of unit cohesion that repeatedly survived the anguish of battle experience.
New England units did not dissolve upon contact with the enemy, including direct
assaults in the most violent situations. Pay and a contract cannot explain how regiments
from the Bay Colony and the rest ofNew England could succeed time and again
throughout the first half of the eighteenth century against professional soldiers, nor why
New England units performed well, when given a chance, against professional armies in
the French and Indian War, despite the conclusions of other recent historians. In this
regard, it is more useful to focus on the relationship between the provincial officers and
their subordinates.
The voluntary soldiers of the provincial armies trusted their officers to lead them
into battle with common sense and loyalty found in a unique relationship that
incorporated the values of their society, sufficiently changed to meet battlefield
conditions. Unlike most English commanders, the officers of Massachusetts
could not
rely on their honor and a draconian system of discipline to force
obedience from their
soldiers. Instead, they led by exemplifying courage, common sense,
and religious
fortitude and thereby maintaining the effective loyalty of
their men. They were expected
2 See Guy Chefs Conquering the Wilderness: The Triumph of
European Warfare in the Colonial
Northeast, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
2003).
to uphold the contractual obligations of provincial enlistments while enforcing "fair"
discipline against transgressors. Furthermore, it was expected that they would adhere to
the tactical norms developed in the colonies, attacking when advantageous, defending
when necessary, but always keeping the welfare of their soldiers foremost in their minds.
This tacit code of military etiquette created a relationship between officers and men
totally foreign to the professional army of England. Rather than rely on a complete
separation between classes to create effectiveness on the battlefield, the colonial forces
succeeded by maintaining a sense of social equality viewed as dishonorable by their
British counterparts.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE BRITISH OFFICER
Social institutions tend to reflect the cultural values of that society because they
are products of that culture. The British Army of the eighteenth century was no different
in this regard. Though the specific workings of the military conformed to outside
influences, such as tactics and technology, the overarching professional ethos reflected
British society as a whole. In war, hierarchy and discipline are necessary to accomplish
victory in the face of immanent death. The British version of this took the form of
exaggerated separation of classes and extreme punishment. Though as much as one-third
of the junior officers came from the ranks (who, without money or patronage,
overwhelmingly remained junior) , the British aristocracy and its ethos dominated the
officer corps, soldiers came from the working class and were enlisted for life, and most
offenses against the British Articles ofWar were punishable by death, much as crimes
were punishable in civil society.
The Imperial army of the eighteenth century was a product of the New Model
Army, created in 1645. With the advent of a series of defeats for the Parliamentary
forces early in the English Civil War, Puritans in the House of Commons perceived a
need to rectify their military mission with the Will of God. Previously, members of
Parliament could simultaneously serve as officers in the army and have a seat in
government. A new sense of "self-denial" was necessary, they thought, to bring them
God's favor renewed and they began to call for a separation of civil and military
3
Steven Charles Eames, Rustic Warriors: Warfare and the Provincial Soldier on the
Northern Frontier,
1689-1748, (University of New Hampshire: UMI, 1989), p. 335-6.
5
authority. Parliament was the place for debate over military strategy, not on the field of
battle between commanders. This new vision alarmed many in the House of Lords who
feared further restrictions on aristocratic power and privilege. A compromise was
reached whereby both Houses were needed to approve commissions and the bill was
passed on February 17, 1645.
4
Though this new institution would seem, to modern eyes, to fit well with a
growing concept of democracy, in which military power was subordinate to civil
authority, Oliver Cromwell's tenure as dictator did much to sour English public opinion
in regards to a standing army. For five years, from 1653 to 1658, Cromwell ruled over
England as a dictator, using the New Model Army to establish his control and to enforce
his rule over both the Rump Parliament and English society. Upon his death, despite
naming his son as successor, Cromwell's army fell into disarray largely because
Parliament was unable to afford its payroll.
5
After many months of instability, General George Monck marched on London in
1660 from Scotland with his unit, the Coldstream Guards to re-establish order. He
encamped his soldiers outside the gates of the city demanding that the Rump Parliament
be dissolved, called for free elections, and openly supported the return of Charles II.
Once it was clear that those demands would be met, Monck submitted his military power
to the authority of the newly elected Parliament
6
4 Mark A. Kishlanski, The Rise ofthe New Model Army, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979),
p. 28-40.
5 Noel T. St. John Williams, Redcoats and Courtesans: The Birth ofthe
British Army (1660-1690),
(London: Brassey's Ltd., 1994), p. 3-4.
6
Ibid., p. 5-8.
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Within a year, in February of 1661, the New Model Army was disbanded and the
new British military institution was formally established, in the name of the king and
under the command of General Monck. This new institution was still subject to
Parliamentary control because funding had to be voted upon and given by the House of
Commons, but the commissioning of the officers came directly from the king. Under the
new laws, the English army was an expansion of the traditional King's Guard concept
from medieval Europe. Though the king no longer had to call upon vassals to supply
their own units to support his war aims, the army was still viewed as an extension of the
king's authority and, until the end of King James II's reign, was paid for out of the royal
allowances. By the late seventeenth century, however, the army had grown to over
34,000 soldiers and their salaries began to be paid for out of the Parliamentary funding
for county militias, which were still dear to many an Englishman's heart but no longer
practical to the defense of a growing empire.
7
The British army was bom during a period of the tensions between monarch and
Parliament, aristocracy and bourgeoisie, Anglican and Puritan cultural values. Common
ground was found, though, which balanced a fear of monarchical authority and abuse
found in Europe's standing army tradition and the needs to grow and protect
imperial
power abroad. County militias were perceived by the growing British gentry as a
salutary restraint to absolutism in England, if impractical for the
projection of power in
British colonies. This faith in militias for local defense was exported
to the North
8
American colonies during this time.
7
Ibid., p. 22-5, 45, 219-20.
8
Ibid., p. 22-5.
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As stated above, the king was responsible for commissioning officers. This was
accomplished through the purchase system British officers purchased their commissions
until 1 870. The purchase system enforced the social requirement that all officers be
aristocrats of either wealthy means or noble patronage or the sons of rich merchants who
could afford their commission. Officers were not paid well and promotions were not
determined by experience or merit, but were purchased from a superior officer at the time
of his retirement or his own promotion. To rise in rank an officer needed either inherited
wealth or patronage from his supporters The system was open to serious abuse. Prior to
the reign of Queen Anne, it was not unknown for high commissions to be purchased for
nobility at their birth.
10
This was deemed beneficial both by the monarch and the
Parliament because it meant that the officer was in charge of his retirement. It was by
selling his commission that an officer was able to leave the service and maintain himself
as a civilian.
The British system of patronage and purchase within the officer corps not only
insisted upon the nobility and wealth of its members, it also inculcated primary adherence
to honor. Among officer-gentlemen, dueling was common The smallest slight could
send two officers into a field, each with his "second" to prepare weapons and possible
funeral arrangements, to fight with sword or pistol for their family or regiment's
honor.
Though these contests were publicly denounced by the administration of the army,
they
were difficult to obstruct when even generals were guilty of the infraction, as
was the
9 http://www.saQdhursl mod . uk/history/indcx him
10
A.J. Barker, Red Coals , (London: Gordon Crcmoncsi, Ltd.. 1976), p.
8
case with Generals William Howe and Thomas Gates in 1778, during the American
Revolution. 11
In relationship to their soldiers, British officers were charged with inculcating in
them loyalty to king, country, and regiment. An officer's ability to lead his troops came
from authority that had its foundations in several areas. Common soldiers in the British
army came from a society highly stratified and hierarchically rigid. Lower class men
were used to obedience towards the aristocracy by tradition, so an officer's social rank
reinforced his authority over his soldiers. All soldiers in a regiment were placed in the
position of total dependency on their regimental commanders. Parliament had enacted a
pay and clothing system that placed the regimental commander in charge of the soldiers'
financial and physical well-being. The commander received all allowances, clothing,
food, and pay for his men. His paymaster and quartermaster were then charged with the
disbursal of funds and support by which the soldiers lived. This created dependency
among the soldiers, not just for their institution (ie. the regiment) but for their officers as
well. Finally, military honor demanded that officers place themselves in danger, with
their men, on the field of battle. Though they were encouraged to indoctrinate their men
with draconian discipline to enforce order in combat, the example of the officer's
courage
gave him a moral authority over his men that they would be willing to follow.
If honor and courage were the foundations of officer authority, discipline
was the
structure through which the officer corps attained success on the battlefield
with their
soldiers. Discipline was understood to mean the difference
between victory and defeat in
12
11
Ibid., p. 28.
1
2
Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of
Military Life in the Revolutionary
Period, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p.
132.
9
combat. Soldiers were required to stand in formation and face a brutal onslaught of
artillery and musket balls while firing and reloading their muskets at the rate of once
every thirty seconds. And if they managed to survive the first minutes of this terror, they
could expect to face a cavalry charge on their flanks by the enemy's heavy horse. The
training to make men capable of such actions in the face of certain maiming or death was
similarly brutal and born from the changing tactics and technology of the day.
The tacticians of early modern warfare were attempting to keep up with the
advancing technology of the eighteenth century European tactics in the seventeenth
century relied upon four main types of units. Artillery had become lighter and was no
longer relegated to use solely in fortifications or at sea. Instead, artillery batteries took the
field and decimated infantry formations with cannon balls and grapeshot. The infantry
was composed oftwo different formations. Musketeers carried heavy matchlock muskets
that required forks for support and were unwieldy in maneuver but deadly in firepower.
To protect these musketeers against cavalry, the second type of infantry, the pikeman,
was used in phalanx-like formations. Pikemen wore armor and wielded a long spear, or
pike, to keep fast moving dragoons, or heavy cavalry, at bay. The fourth main combat
unit, the mounted dragoon, was utilized for flanking maneuvers to overwhelm the
enemy's infantry and to drive them from the field.
Eighteenth-century technological innovation fundamentally changed this
paradigm. The heavy matchlocks were replaced in the 1690's by the flintlock
musket, in
the British army, and those were standardized in 1 730 by the Long
Pattern Musket, or
"Brown Bess".
13 Musketeers did not wear armor and the flintlock, a lighter and
more
13 Christopher L Archer, John R. Ferris, Holger H. Herwig,
and Timothy H E. Travers, World History of
Warfare, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2002), p.
322.
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maneuverable weapon, allowed infantrymen to be more mobile on the battlefield.
Another innovation, the ball and socket bayonet, removed the need for pikemen as
protection against cavalry and they were retired from service in 1704. Instead, all
infantrymen became musketeers with the ability to shoot their weapon on the move and
defend themselves from other units on the battlefield. Their rate of fire increased
somewhat with the introduction of prepared cartridges but their ability to produce
accurate fire was sacrificed for a higher rate of fire. It has been estimated that a flintlock
using paper cartridges could be discharged twice a minute which doubled the rate of fire
compared to a matchlock musket. Flintlocks had a misfire rate of about 1 out of 3;
matchlocks 1 out of 2 .
14
Soldiers used balls smaller than the bore of their muzzles in
order to ease reloading despite the resultant tumbling of the ball down the barrel when
fired which seriously compromised accuracy. British officers did not trust their men to
aim and think under fire, that was the prerogative of the officer, and so the sacrifice of
accuracy was not significant.
15
For this reason, volley fire, or firing muskets in unison
and on command, was deemed necessary. Soldiers were placed in ranks and commanded
to volley fire by platoon, creating a rolling fire, in order to increase the overall rate of fire
of the formation. Draconian discipline was required for this drill to be performed in the
face of enemy fire.
16
British soldiers accepted their brutal training out of the necessities of large-scale
warfare and because of cultural mores. Non-commissioned officers understood the utility
of ingrained drilling for success on the European battlefield, where unlimited war had
14 David Chandler, The Art of War in the Age ofMarlborough, (Staplehurst, England, 1990),
75-79.
15 Hans Delbriick, The Dawn ofModern Warfare, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1985), p.
269-71.
16
Ibid., p. 269-71.
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become the military norm. And in British society, the legal use of corporal and capital
punishment was well established. Still, the summary use of the cane to discipline
privates, while still in use through the eighteenth century, was becoming less permissible.
Personal violence by officers against their men was replaced late in the seventeenth
century by the regimental and general court-martial system, codified in 1685 in the
Articles of War. Regimental courts-martial heard corporal crimes and general courts-
martial were convened in capital cases. While this more rational and less arbitrary legal
system lent more protection to eighteenth century soldiers, flogging was common and
sentences of a thousand lashes was normal. In fact, flogging as a form of disciplinary
1
8
punishment in the British army was not formally abolished until 1881.
Fred Anderson describes the British disciplinary system as one of "justice, terror,
and mercy".
19 The law was an entity of its own, an impartial stricture that applied to
every man, regardless of status. Punishment for an infraction was swift and terrible,
often death. Once the sentence had been passed, the condemned was led to either the
gallows or the flogging post, in front of the entire regiment, and his sentence was read.
But his fate could be averted, at the last moment, by mercy. The commander of the
regiment, as the representative of the crown, had the authority to reduce the
punishment,
or pardon the soldier altogether. As such, military tribunals became a sort of tragic
morality play, with the accused soldier as the moral underdog, his fate
indeterminate unt
20
the final minute, and hinged upon the word of his commander.
,7
Frey, p. 80-1.
18
Ibid., p. 93.
19 Anderson, A People 'sArmy, p.121.
20
Ibid., p. 121-3.
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By the time of British military intervention in the American colonies in 1755, a
system of social hierarchy, honor, and discipline was well established within the
institution of the "Redcoats". Though successful in the European theater, and similar to
other like institutions on the Continent, the British military could not have been more
dissimilar to the military institution that had evolved in the British colonies for the last
century and a half, especially in New England, under the military objectives of limited
warfare, the petite guerre. At the onset of the Seven Years' War in the colonies, this
difference would prove disastrous for the professional British establishment.
When Major General Edward Braddock arrived in the colonies in February 1755,
he was unprepared for the difficulties that awaited him which arose from the differences
between North American colonial society and Great Britain. Braddock arrived with the
authority granted him by his patron, the Duke of Cumberland, to assume overall
command of His Majesty's forces in British America. While awaiting the arrival of his
two regiments from Ireland, the 44
th
and 48
th
Foot, Braddock demanded a meeting with
the colonial governors in April to tell them ofLondon's plan for campaigns that year. He
explained that four separate expeditions were planned in order to push the French
from
the Ohio Valley and off of the shores of the Great Lakes, in hopes of confining her
to the
northern reaches of the St. Lawrence.
General Braddock would head west with his two regiments and attack Fort
Duquesne in the Ohio Valley. Simultaneously, William Shirley, who had been
promoted
to Major General and placed second-in-command behind Braddock, would lead
an
expedition to seize Fort Niagara, where he would rendezvous
with Braddock's victorious
troops coming north from Fort Duquesne. William Johnson
was to be placed in charge of
13
a third expedition to seize Fort St. Frederic at Crown Point on Lake Chaplain, while a
fourth expedition moved by sea north from Boston to attack two French forts on Nova
Scotia. Governor Shirley complained that this plan was too ambitious and should be
scaled down, as did the other governors, and he suggested that Duquesne be attacked
after Niagara was occupied. The outpost relied upon Fort Niagara for supplies and troops
and would be more easily destroyed as a secondary target.
Edward Braddock had not attained his vaunted position through battlefield
experience. Instead, Cumberland had promoted Braddock for two other reasons. First,
Braddock was an excellent administrator, a quality he had illustrated when placed in
charge of the garrison and colony of Minorca. Second, he followed orders to the letter
and demanded that his subordinates do the same. Braddock' s orders were to follow the
plan set in London and force the colonists to support him in that endeavor. He ignored
colonial advice and dismissed the governors with demands that they raise the required
provincial troops and supply the English regiments with quarters and supplies necessary
for the upcoming campaigns.
21
When Braddock marched west to his destiny, he made several decisions that were
not unexpected, decisions which in another theater might not have proved so costly.
First, according to Fred Anderson, he decided that he did not need Indian
allies. In fact,
after the newly appointed Indian agent for the South, George Croghan,
managed to gather
several hundred Shawnee, Delaware, Mingo, and other tribal warriors
Braddock
proceeded to assure them that once the British had managed to drive
the French from the
Ohio Valley they would ensure that no Indians would be allowed
to use the land for
21
Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years '
War and the Fate ofEmpire in British North
America, 1754-1766, (London: Faber & Faber, Inc., 2000), p.
86-88.
14
themselves. Not surprisingly, only seven Mingo warriors were convinced to help as
guides on the expedition. Second, Braddock made it known that colonial soldiers were
next to useless because of their lack of discipline. Although he had them drilled over the
three weeks before they began their march, he trusted only the 44th and 48th Foot while
ignoring the flexibility irregulars could have given him. Third, the general rejected the
advice of local experts who advised him to take a shorter route to Fort Duquesne. The
original plan had been finalized in London by staff officers who had not been on the
ground and did not understand the density of the forests or the difficulties of river travel
in North America. The military experts who knew of the problems Braddock would
encounter were not British officers, only colonial governors and militia leaders.
24
The results of these decisions were long days of short marching because of the
stultifying heat. Braddock chose to split his forces, causing a rift of some sixty miles
when combat was joined. Furthermore, Braddock suffered from a complete lack of
intelligence as to the composition of the enemy ahead; he also commanded force
composed of units which had not trained together and who did not trust one another to
fight properly. Braddock's army had made less than 25 miles from its start point at
Will's Creek, after the first seven days of marching, because the path was
small and
choked with vegetation. To allow the artillery to pass, pioneers hacked a
road out of the
wilderness but the process was taking too long. Braddock had received
news that the
French were aware of his expedition and had sent for reinforcements.
He had to hurry.
22
Ibid., p. 87.
23
Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela, (Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1977), p.
15.
24 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 88-90.
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Making the decision to split his force, Braddock placed the regular inland y in a Hying
column in ordci to advance as swiftly as possible to citlu i invest the fort or occupy it,
depending on whether or not French forces were present The baggage and the rest of
Braddock9 1 army would follow behind, improving the load and providing support upon
theii arrival u> Duquesne.
When Braddock* I Ibices folded the Monongahela River on July 1755, they
were vulnerable tO attack They crossed the obstacle without incident because the Irench
fences, composed largely of Canadiens and then Indian allies, had delayed leaving the
fort until after the Irench commander had shamed them into action and a war song had
been sung They were not, therefore, in position to ambush the British at the ford site, as
they had planned Instead, the two forces met in route to their separate objectives It was
repor ted that the liritish fired first, killing the commander of the I rench contingent,
Captain de lleaujeu The liritish had had time to regroup alter the crossing, forming b;ick
into an advance guard. Hank security forces, the main body, and a rear guard.
' Their
discipline was held firm throughout the twenty-two day march and did not fail at the end
Yet some historians, Fred Anderson included, believe it was this adherence to
discipline
27
that doomed the majority of the liritish soldiers to death that day.
What had not been accomplished by Braddock were any modifications to his
troops
1
tactical abilities which would allow them to fight against an enemy that
hid
behind cover and fir ed aimed shots Fifteen of eighteen officers in
the advance gu.nl
died in the fust ten minutes of the battle That was
not luck The Indian warriors knew
Koppcrm;in, p 10
M
Ibid., p. 3149.
27 Anderson, ( Yucible ofWar, p 102-3.
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to aim at the soldiers wearing the silver gorgets of the officer caste, riding horses and
carrying swords. Instead of withdrawing to better ground, upon receiving the news of
the advance guard's injuries, Braddock chose to ride forward, bringing the main body of
his troops into the ambush site. This caused even greater confusion when the two units
collided, one attempting to retreat, the other rushing into the fray. Most eyewitness
accounts have called Braddock's actions heroic, placing the blame for the utter
devastation of two British regiments at the hands of only 200 Indians and Canadien
militiamen on the British soldiers for failing to maintain order. They cite incidents of
fratricide that occurred when soldiers fired on other platoons that crossed into their
sectors of fire and upon colonials from the rear guard who began fighting from behind
trees and other cover once their colonel was killed. Actually, it was Braddock's
arrogance that caused him to make a rash decision. He knew that French colonial
irregulars and a few barbarians were no match for the King's finest. It was inconceivable
he could be defeated so he rode forward with every confidence that if he stood his
ground, he would carry the day. His soldiers maintained their discipline, though they
often remained in only platoon sized elements, but they did not have many officers left to
give them orders. And rather than attempt a flanking maneuver or an orderly withdrawal
back to the river, Braddock and his remaining officers continued to attempt to form the
line and fire volleys into the woods. The result was seventy percent casualties and the
effective loss of two regiments.
Ibid., p. 100.
Koppcrman, p. xxii.
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Edward Braddock was a courageous man. It was his courage that allowed him to
fight on, even after four horses had been shot out from under him, and it was this
personal attribute that made other courageous men, like George Washington, continue to
support his legacy after the battle. His decisions were decidedly predictable, given his
social status and upbringing in England and his training as an officer in the British Army.
Yet the Battle at Monongahela highlighted a weakness within both the tactics and the
institution of the British Army in the North American theater. Not every battle would
simply be a siege of a fort. Not many battlefields would be in open terrain. The British
Navy would not always be present to keep supply lines open or to close them against the
French. Time and again from Monongahela until the Battle of Quebec, the British Army
would learn that getting to the battlefield was a battle, and combat in the field was not a
foregone conclusion with victory reserved to he who had the most disciplined troops.
According to John Grenier and Steven Charles Eames, what had developed on the
frontiers ofNorth America was limited warfare that did not attempt the achievement of
decisive victory.
30
Instead, raids, ambushes, and attacks of opportunity were used to
wear down opponents or massacre the unwary. British concepts of honor and hierarchy
on the battlefield found small purchase in this new theater.
30 Steven Charles Eames, Rustic Warriors: Warfare and the Provincial Soldier
on the Northern Frontier,
1689-1748, (University of New Hampshire, 1989). ...
John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier,
1607-1814, (Cambridge
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PROVINCIAL OFFICER
There is little dispute among military historians that the officers in the British and
colonial armies were quite different. The ability of the two systems to conduct war,
though, has usually been viewed as effective in the case of the English institution and
disappointing in regards to the American. An illustration of two typical officers provides
insight into this predominant framework.
Colonel Ephraim Williams Junior, who died at the age of forty in the Battle of
Lake George, 1755, spent almost half of his life as a colonial officer on the western
frontier of Massachusetts. After what some scholars speculate was a youth spent at sea,
31
the young Ephraim joined his father to help establish the town of Stockbridge,
Massachusetts. The first document to pinpoint Williams' location prior to King George's
War is a survey he conducted in 1742 for land bought by his father. For a while after his
thirtieth birthday, he was living in Stockbridge and working as the deputy sheriff under
Oliver Partridge.
32
It can be assumed that he was also a member of the local militia,
probably as a sentinel, since there is no documentation of a commission during this
period. At the outbreak of hostilities between France and England in 1744, however,
31
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Ephraim's life becomes much clearer with his commission as a captain in the provincial
army under the command of Colonel Stoddard.33
During the early 1740's, Massachusetts and New York were in dispute over the
boundaries of the two colonies. In defiance ofNew York's claims, Colonel Stoddard and
Governor William Shirley commissioned the construction of a line of four forts along the
Bay Colony's western border. Ostensibly to guard against Indian raids, these forts served
the secondary purpose of solidifying Massachusetts' land claims. Initially under the
command of Captain William "Billy" Williams, Stoddard's nephew, supervision was
granted to Ephraim Williams in 1745 when the previous commander joined the
expedition to Louisbourg.
34
For the next decade, Williams commanded first the entire fort line along the
western border of Massachusetts, from 1745 to 1746 and then soldiers at Fort
Massachusetts until 175 2.
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Both Williams' failure and success as a commander during
this time are important. In the summer of 1746, John Stoddard directed all the Williams'
under his command, including not only Ephraim Williams Junior but also Ephraim's
father, Major Williams and his uncle, Captain Billy Williams, to join officers in
Hampshire County in recruiting soldiers for Shirley's planned expedition against Canada.
While Ephraim Williams Junior was traveling the county "drumming up" recruits, a
process made more difficult by the strains of defending the frontier from French and
Indian raiders, Fort Massachusetts was attacked and burned to the ground.
Technically
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speaking, the fort was under Williams' command and his responsibility. Its destruction
spread fear throughout the frontier and called into question among the populace the
methods by which their safety was being assured. 36
While this mistake by Stoddard and Williams was serious, the people of the
county tended not to blame Williams for it. Though he might have refused to leave his
command as ordered or should have placed another competent officer in charge during
his absence, the public scorn was laid primarily at the feet of John Stoddard. Following
a summer of reconstructing the fort in 1747, Ephraim commanded the soldiers at the fort
and the entire fort line again for another five years During that time, he successfully
repulsed a raiding party in 1748 and gained a reputation for diligent management that
Wyllis Wright attributes to Williams' return as commander of the fort in 1 754, though
Kevin Sweeney does argue his return had more to do with kinship and patronage. What
seems clear is that Williams learned from the defeat and at the least regained his
reputation through service to the colony. As Steven Charles Eames states in his
dissertation on provincial armies of New England, "The ability to lead, marked the
successful, long-serving provincial officer ...incompetency ...resulted in social disgrace
and professional oblivion."
40 Ephraim Williams Junior's military career was far from
over in 1747. It would not end until his death eight years later, in combat.
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During his second stint as commander of the fort line along the western frontier,
Williams had the opportunity to face the enemy that had previously shamed both him and
his military establishment. In a letter dated August 2, 1748, Williams described an Indian
attack on Fort Massachusetts he successfully repelled. Though King George's War had
concluded, tensions were still high on the frontier. Captain Williams had received
scouting reports that French and Indian war parties had been sighted between the fort and
their supply center in Deerfield. Though Ephraim's lieutenants managed to return safely
with new supplies, the commander suspected, due to the disquiet among his guard dogs,
that enemy forces lay in ambush a short distance outside the enclosure. Their presence
could threaten to isolate the fort and Williams devised a plan to force the enemy to
withdraw. He told fifty men to ready their weapons while he and his lieutenants planned
an attack around the flank of the suspected ambush position. The rest of his forces would
man the cannon and provide cover and armed support but a chain of events on the ground
thwarted his plan.
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One of the fort's guard dogs found an enemy Indian and attacked. The Indian
shot the dog, revealing his position. At the same time, without the knowledge of Captain
Williams, between 12 and 15 colonials had sallied forth from the gate and fired upon the
enemy position, which returned fire. Williams quickly assessed the situation and led
another thirty-five men out of the gate to meet the enemy and force their withdrawal.
Though successful, Williams was unaware of a secondary ambush, which was initiated
immediately. Williams led his men back to the fort under fire, conducting a
defense from
the fortification that eventually forced the retreat of the French
and Indians. He was
unable to assess enemy casualties because they carried their dead
and wounded off the
41
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field, but his unit sustained only three casualties, two ofwhom soon died of their
wounds. 42
This engagement is important for three reasons. First, the discipline of some
colonials was certainly wanting. Bravado overcame good tactical sense for the 12 to 15
men that left the fort without orders and placed themselves, and their comrades, in
unnecessary danger. The tactical patience of the commander, however, was evident, as
was his tactical knowledge. Williams utilized simultaneous planning when he ordered
his men to prepare for combat while he planned the attack, knowing that he had limited
time in which to catch the enemy by surprise. His desire to drive the enemy from their
suspected position illustrates his proper sense that his forces' success and survival hinged
upon seizing the initiative. Furthermore, his plan to flank the enemy was sound, given
the terrain. Second, the colonials were properly trained. No military plan survives first
contact with the enemy and the fighting ability of Williams' unit allowed for flexibility to
adapt to a rapidly changing situation. These men quickly attacked under fire, defeated
the first position, stood their ground during the second attack, and withdrew to the fort
without panic, eventually winning the engagement. They accomplished all this with only
three casualties. Finally, Williams guessed that the enemy had sustained high casualties.
While casualty rates for the enemy were often exaggerated during this period and
Williams certainly had motive to inflate success in order to regain some of his reputation,
his assessment was based on the fact that his men had fired five to six rounds apiece from
"no greater distance than 15 rods (82 yards) - a great many shots not above 7 rods (38.5
Ibid., p. 30-1.
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yards) " In other words, Williams was confident in the marksmanship of his soldiers
and he expected his rationale to pass muster with his superiors and the public. Taken
together, the account illustrates training and preparedness at the fort that belies an
understanding of the provincials as rag tag and the officers as "common and stupid". 44
Williams remained in command of the frontier forts until 1752. Two years later,
in anticipation of another upcoming war and the decline of discipline at Fort
Massachusetts, Williams was asked by Governor Shirley to first serve again as
commander of the forts and then as a colonel in command of his own regiment. Williams
was commissioned by the governor to raise a regiment in support of the Crown Point
expedition, an operation planned by both the northern colonies and London authorities to
drive the French off of Lake George and out of the Hudson River Valley. His enlistments
came largely from western Massachusetts where he had become immensely popular as a
military commander.
These successive promotions had less to do with Williams' reputation among his
superiors and more to do with his local reputation. Governor Shirley and other elites
were compelled to promote men who could, through their local reputations, fill the levies
and man the proposed units in the provincial armies for each campaign. Williams had
gained just such a reputation over the years in which he protected western Massachusetts
at the frontier forts, despite one significant setback. As an example of this over-riding
prerequisite for command in the colonies, John Stoddard wrote of Williams in 1748 to
Governor Shirley:
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Capt. Ephraim Williams must be thought the fittest man that is likely to be
obtained. He is accounted a man of courage, has lived at Fort-Massachusetts, and
is well knowing in that country.
It is generally talked that he maintains good government & I know no man
amongst us (except Col. Williams) that men would more cheerfully list under
than he...
45
This suggests that a man's character and reputation that empowered him to provide
voluntary enlistments in his command was paramount in New England's colonies. In
opposition to Williams, men like Pasco Chubb, who surrendered Fort William Henry in
1696, were either imprisoned or became social pariahs. 46
After a month of delays caused by a lack of supplies from Boston, Williams led
his regiment to a rendezvous at Albany in July 1755. His unit fell under the command of
Major General William Johnson of New York. The army marched north, through
German Flats and on to what would soon be called Fort Edwards. General Johnson left
one hundred men of the New Hampshire regiment at the fort to await resupply of both
materiel and men, leading the rest of the 2500 men from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
New York further north to the south shore of Lake George and the proposed site for a
new fortification. It was at this site, the soon-to-be Fort William Henry, that Johnson
learned he was about to have company.
Jean Erdman, the Baron Dieskau, had arrived earlier in the season with three
thousand regulars from France and had made his way to Fort Carillon in response to the
fears of the Governor-General ofNew France, Vaudreuil, that English forces might seize
Crown Point. Dieskau decided that rather than defend Ticonderoga, he would
seize the
initiative and attack Fort Edwards which lay south of his position, a few
miles below the
Wright, p. 26-7.
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south shore of Lake George. With a select unit of 600 Indians, 680 Canadians and 200
French regulars, Dieskau began his march south towards Fort Edwards on September 4,
1755.
When Mohawk scouts discovered the large French trail three days later, Johnson
sent two separate groups of messengers, one on horseback and four on foot, to warn his
small contingent at Fort Edwards of their danger. Baron Dieskau had arrived on the
Johnson Road that connected the unfortified camp at Lake George with Fort Edwards at
about the same time the messengers were en route to the fort. The messenger on horse, a
soldier named Adams, was shot as he rode past while the four foot messengers returned
to Lake George, unable to reach the fort. At the council of war that next morning,
Johnson decided to assemble a group of one thousand colonials and two hundred Indians,
led by Col. Williams and the Mohawk chief Hendricks, to march to the relief of what
they believed would be a soon besieged fortification.
Baron Dieskau had made a different decision, however, with the new intelligence
he had acquired from Johnson's dead messenger. Since the French allied Indians were
reluctant to attack a fortified position, Dieskau chose instead to shift his attack north on
the unfortified camp, despite the larger number of colonial troops. The French
commander moved slowly, with scouts on his flanks because he did not know if Johnson
had placed any picket lines in front of his position. Dieskau needed
surprise to seize the
initiative in the anticipated battle. Williams, on the other hand,
was moving as quickly as
possible to the relief of what he believed was a small contingent under
siege. His group
was in column and separated into three units, the Indians under
the leadership of
Hendrick in the van, followed by colonials under the direct
command of Williams, with a
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rear guard under the command of Lt. Col. Whiting from Connecticut. When he reached
Rocky Brook, Williams was still many miles from Fort Edwards and less than three miles
from his starting point on the lake.
At the brook, between West Mountain and French Mountain, Dieskau was
waiting in an ambush. He had captured an English deserter early in the morning and
decided to trap the advancing provincial force in the ravine. He arranged his forces in a
hook formation, on the high ground overlooking the military road, with his Indians and
Canadians along the leg of the hook and his French grenadiers forming the curve at the
end of the trap. As Williams' forces marched into the ravine, someone called out to
Hedrick, riding at the head of the column. It has been assumed by historians that the call
was made by one of the French-allied Caughnawaga warriors unwilling to spill his
Mohawk kin's blood. Regardless, immediately after, shots were fired and thirty
Mohawks, including Chief Hendrick, were killed. The problem for Dieskau was that the
ambush had been initiated prematurely and only a portion of Williams' force was in the
ravine Williams himself quickly led an assault up the ravine, but was killed
immediately, along with some fifty of his men. Another one hundred provincials from
his Massachusetts regiment and the remaining Mohawks began to lay down a suppressive
fire while the rest of the one thousand colonials retreated back to the
lake and General
Johnson. What had become the rear guard, under the command of Lt. Col. Whiting,
was
met by three hundred reinforcements from General Johnson's
position at Lake George
and these soldiers fought a withdrawing action back to the
camp, which was hastily
building impromptu breastworks. This rear guard action delayed
the French forces
significantly and it took them over an hour and a half to
reach the English camp. The
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French Indian commander who had defeated Braddock earlier in the year, Legardeur de
Saint-Pierre, was killed in the battle.
At the camp, Johnson built breastworks from his boats and placed four cannon to
cover the road upon which the French would assault. When Dieskau arrived, his Indian
forces refused to attack, unnerved by the loss of Saint-Pierre and reluctant to attack a
fortified position defended by their Mohawk kinsmen. The baron, intent upon shaming
his Indians and Canadians to fight, placed these irregulars in the surrounding woods and
ordered the French grenadiers to assault. These were some of the finest European
soldiers, resplendent in their white uniforms with bayonets fixed. Marching forward, in
European fashion, six abreast, they were cut down mercilessly by grapeshot from the
English cannons. Though the Indians and Canadians fired in support from the tree line,
the French soldiers were eventually forced to retreat, and Baron Dieskau was wounded
and captured at the end of the day.
At the same time, approximately 150 men, under the command of Capt. Folsom
from New Hampshire and Capt. McGuiness from New York, dispatched from Fort
Edwards, fell upon the retreating French soldiers when they returned to the site of the
original ambush. It was at this battle that the majority of the French casualties occurred,
as they were completely routed and the road between the fort and the
lake was cleared.
The burial party of four hundred men led by Lt. Col. Seth Pomeroy of
Northampton and
dispatched the next day, found 136 provincial dead, including the
bodies of Col. Williams
and Seth Pomeroy' s brother, Daniel. Most of these men
were found scalped and bound
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to trees. Unable to take their captives with them, the retreating Indians had taken scalps
as trophies during the final fight that previous afternoon.47
Much of what occurred during the Bloody Morning Scout is informative to the
successful nature of colonial tactics and leadership. Though many historians have found
fault with Williams' decision not to place flank security out during his march to Fort
Edwards, his intelligence did not suggest a need for them so close to his starting point.
Instead, Williams saw the need for speed at the outset to relieve a very small force at the
fort. This is not an apology for the colonel, for commanders were, and are, often forced
to balance risks in order to accomplish their assigned mission. Force protection may
sometimes be sacrificed for audacity. In this instance, that aggressiveness was
unsuccessful but not inappropriate to the situation as Williams understood it. The real
problem was that his intelligence was not as sound as that given to Baron Dieskau, who
was able to retain the initiative and initiate his ambush.
At the ambush, Williams' leadership and that of his subordinate officers saved the
day for the provincials. Williams reacted immediately to secure his flank and repel the
enemy on the high ground. When this failed, his subordinate commander, Lt. Col.
Whiting, quickly established fire lines to cover the retreat of the main force back to their
encampment and forestalled both a general route of the English and an overwhelming
assault by the French on the position at the lake. Johnson was able to erect a
breastwork
and emplace cannons for the defense of his position. The retreating forces
arrived to
bolster the defense and Dieskau was forced to pause in order to regroup
his men for an
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assault on what had become a fortified position. It was Dieskau's decision to attack with
European tactics that defeated him that day. Had he withdrawn, given the unwillingness
of the predominance of his forces to attack, he could have saved the cream of his troops
and attacked at another location with the valuable information about the composition of
his enemy forces. Instead, he opted to assault and lost his grenadiers, leaving the rest of
the French soldiers without his leadership when he was captured. It was that flawed
leadership, along with the good decision by the Fort Edwards' commander, Col.
Blanchard, to send reinforcements that resulted in the complete route of the French that
day.
This battle, along with others to be discussed like the siege at Louisbourg and
Ticonderoga, will show that the common understanding of colonial forces as rabble good
for little else than road building and the occupation of fortifications is really an
assumption by some historians of an imperial English opinion or a lack of differentiation
between regular warfare and the petite guerre as they were employed in this era. Col.
Williams was a middle-class land speculator turned professional soldier. He served on
the frontier for a decade before commanding his regiment on the Crown Point campaign.
His promotions were the result of his growing reputation among constituents in
Hampshire County of his military prowess and management at the frontier forts.
His
ability to care for his men and guard the settlements meant he could
enlist a greater
number of men for campaigns. He was able to lead well under fire and
this ability was
not special just to him. The officers and soldiers with him did the
same. They were often
too aggressive for their own safety and not all officers
held up well under pressure, but
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when confronted with trained Europeans and Indian warriors, the provincial troops did
not run. They reacted to ambush well and they defeated the best Europe had to offer.
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CHAPTER THREE
NEW ENGLAND'S EXPECTATIONS OF LEADERSHIP
The British officer of the eighteenth century had to meet rather demanding
expectations from many different quarters. These requirements came from political,
social, and military institutions and from his superiors, peers, and subordinates. Great
Britain had structured her army from traditions which reinforced social divisions and
evolved from medieval concepts of royal guards and vassal militia. The modern British
Army started with the Parliamentary armies during the English Civil War which
produced the Coldstream Guard, the personal force of King Charles II, and expanded
under the command of the John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, and Parliament in order
to meet threats from abroad. The officer was an agent of the king. He must come from
the aristocracy and promote the social values of the realm. In other words, the British
officer was expected to embody aristocratic ideals of chivalry, status, and private wealth
in his person and express courage and honor on the battlefield to invoke duty,
loyalty,
and discipline in his soldiers.
The expectations of the colonial officer within his society were markedly
different. The colonial government of Massachusetts required its officers
to have the
ability to raise voluntary regiments for each campaign season, to lead
volunteer garrisons
at frontier forts, and to control local militia within
communities which could provide
basically-trained sentinels during times of war. All of these
requirements led to the need
for officers respected in their communities for their
military skills and their social status.
This respect came less from breeding, though
kinship ties were important, and more from
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their embodiment of other ideals. The officers of the colonial military had to be a
member of the middling class or better, a man who had worked hard within the
community to become a commercial success, either in land surveying and speculating,
gunsmithing, farming, as a merchant, or professional elite. He had to conform to
religious expectations and attend sermon on the appointed days. And he had to have
proven in previous campaigns that he could bring most of his men home for the winter.
He had to be trusted to lead his soldiers in battle with not only the mission in mind but
the welfare of the men in his charge.
Colonial politics made a large standing army impossible. The coffers of the
colonial government could not afford it and the local communities, consisting primarily
of descendants of expelled English Puritans, would not tolerate it. Consistent protection,
at least on the frontier, was necessary, however, and so small contingents of garrisoned
soldiers within the four frontier forts had become a reality by 1745. These fortifications,
and the consistent campaigns against the French, spawned a small group of
professionalized officers, men who pursued civilian careers for income but who served
more time as military officers than not. Ephraim Williams was one such officer.
Though
he worked for periods as a land speculator and surveyor, or as the deputy
sheriff of
Hampshire County, Williams was the commander of Fort Massachusetts for
most of the
ten years between King George's War and the French and Indian
War; he died as a
regimental commander at the Battle ofLake George in 1755. Williams'
successor as
regimental commander, Seth Pomeroy, was another professional
colonial officer with a
great deal of experience.
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Pomeroy was the descendant of blacksmiths who had emigrated to Massachusetts
in the mid-seventeenth century. Born in Northampton in 1706, Seth was the seventh
child from his father's second marriage. He was trained as a blacksmith, earning his
living as such in Northampton. He was certainly involved within the town militia
because his first diary entries place him en route to Boston to participate in the 1745 siege
of the fortress at Louisbourg as a major in the provincial forces. Pomeroy returned from
that campaign to command one of the companies in Joseph Dwight's regiment on the
frontier and then followed Ephraim Williams on the Crown Point campaign as his
second-in-command. After Williams' death, Pomeroy was promoted to colonel, given
command of the regiment, but forced to return home due to severe illness. Though he did
not fight for the rest of the French and Indian War, Seth Pomeroy rushed from
Northampton to Boston to fight at on the left flank of the redoubt on Breed's Hill at the
Battle of Bunker Hill and died in command of the Massachusetts militia in Peekskill,
New York on February 17, 1777.
Though he was not the product of a military academy, nor the son of nobility,
Seth Pomeroy was a soldier and an officer in colonial service for at least thirty-two
of his
seventy-one years. Ephraim Williams was the same. These men had other occupations.
Indeed, they could not have supported themselves or their families if
they did not have
other means of income. Seth Pomeroy, while becoming one of the
wealthiest men in
Northampton, was the seventh son of his father's second marriage,
not the inheritor of a
large estate. Unlike men from other colonies, like George
Washington, Pomeroy and
Williams did not inherit large estates to support them. They
had risen to prominence
within their communities as tradesmen and secured their
military reputations in combat.
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All of this was necessary for them to be successful because without their respectability
they could never have done the one thing their political leaders required of them: raise a
regiment to fight for a campaign.
Correspondence between Governor William Shirley and his chief military leaders
throughout the colony highlight this expectation of prospective officers. Writing to Col.
John Stoddard, the chief military commander in Hampshire County, Shirley says.
Sir:
I have received your letters of the 19 and 21 instant. I am sensible that the
contention among the officers employed for the raising soldiers for the expedition
and their solicitations for drawing over those that are upon the point of agreeing
with other officers is a great prejudice to the service, and I should have been glad
to have an effectual remedy applyed to their misconduct in this affair, and as I
have oppertunity I shal let 'em know my disapprobation thereof. . .The four
officers you mention viz Lieutenant-Colonel (William) Williams, Major (Seth)
Pomeroy, Captain (Ephraim) Williams (Senior) of Stockbridge, and Captain
Ephraim Williams (Junior) will be very agreeable to me, provided they do their
part in raising the men otherwise some inconvenience may ensue; but I would
still hope for a fifth company out of your country; and it may be a few days more
will give some considerable advantage to some of the recruiting officers -
1
would endeavor that all proper methods be used for making those officers easy
who have inlisted a number of men and yet must be disappointed as to their
48
having any command over 'em...
In this letter to Colonel Stoddard, Governor Shirley is attempting to solicit the advice of
his old military adviser on several problems. The letter was written in the summer of
1746 when Shirley was trying to gather another expedition to head north against Canada,
this time to seize Montreal while the British fleet attacked Quebec. Shirley's main
problem was that some officers around the colony had not raised enough troops to form
companies. The soldiers enlisted to serve under specific officers and those officers were
expecting to command units. The government was forced to rearrange those terms
somewhat, in order to create viable units with enough men. Furthermore,
some officers,
48
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aggressive in their pursuit of a commission for what could be a very profitable campaign,
had been stealing the enlistments of men from other officers, to the dismay of both.
These soldiers would often desert or claim their enlistments void if they did not get
assigned in companies with their own and under the command of their own officers.
Finally, Shirley had some officers that were very qualified to lead on the frontier but had
not spent the time to raise their own units. Others had done so but were needed on the
frontier while the men they had enlisted would be required to march north without them,
a situation objected to by both the officers and their men.
The importance of this correspondence between the colonial governor and his
military officers reflects the reality that officers were expected to raise soldiers for
upcoming campaigns and that their ability to do so determined, to some extent, their
position within the ranks. While kinship ties played a role in who Stoddard put forward
as candidates for command (the Williamses were tied by marriage and blood to John
Stoddard), it was their reputations and abilities to recruit that mattered most. Equally
accepted was the importance of the enlisted soldier's expectations in regard to who would
command him in the field. The colonial sentinel enlisted for a campaign season with the
expectation of release from service by the winter of that campaign to return home. This
meant that his continued service during a longer war would require his willingness to re-
enlist the next summer.
We do not have to guess how these soldiers felt about their service. Colonial
soldiers of this period had a high literacy rate. They often kept diaries
of their
experiences and were not reticent when it came to their opinions of the
officers in charge
of them. Rufus Putnam, who served as a private soldier from 1758-9,
was promoted to
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sergeant for the 1760 campaigns when his growing status at home allowed him to enlist
eight soldiers from the area. During his time at Ticonderoga in 1758, Putnam wrote:
Mr. Collins character undoubtedly Suffered.
. .we did not complain - however
when an officer is brought to Solicit his soldiers not to complain of him, he must
feal Small in his own eyes, as well as Contemptable in the eyes of others. 49
Mr. Collins, the lieutenant in charge of a reconnaissance Putnam participated in, had fled
the field upon contact with some Indians allied to the French. This act of cowardice,
coupled with his desertion of his men, was intolerable. Putnam was equally critical of
generals he viewed as cowards. When General Webb refused to support the besieged
Fort William Henry with his 4000 troops located down the road at Fort Edwards, Putnam
wrote that he and the other colonials saw this refusal as an act of cowardice and many
soldiers promptly began to desert.
50 By the end of this campaign, Putnam vowed never to
enlist again. He had been detached from his company because the British regulars were
in need of a skilled carpenter to help build roads and fortifications. Putnam was promised
(and he took the assignment with the expectation of) extra pay to complete the task. The
British officer in charge refused to pay at the end of the campaign and Putnam returned
home embittered. Only after Colonel Ruggles promised a promotion to sergeant in return
for Putnam's enlistment of other Americans in his town would Rufus agree to serve for
another campaign.
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Many other soldiers saved their harshest criticisms for the British officers under
whom they were forced to serve following the dismissal of William Shirley. When Lord
Loudoun took charge of the war in 1756, the provincial armies of Massachusetts
fell
49 Putnam, p. 12-3.
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under nominal command of the British regulars. Though the legislature of Massachusetts
was able to convince Loudoun that soldiers would not enlist unless they were guaranteed
to stay within colonial units commanded by colonial officers, they were unable to avoid
taking orders from the British high command. The Reverend Daniel Shute complained
bitterly about the British conduct during the assault on Fort Ticonderoga in 1758 He
believed that General Abercrombie acted irresponsibly when he ordered a frontal assault
on the breastworks, without artillery support, that resulted in casualties upward of 2000.
He called the attack a "rash attempt" that killed so many regular officers a Council of
52
War could not even be convened the next day!
Stephen Cross, of Newbury, Massachusetts, a carpenter stationed at Fort Oswego,
enlisted to build bateaux for the campaign against Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario in
1 756. He was present for the capture of the fort and was shipped first to Quebec and then
to France as a prisoner of war. Cross had marched up from Boston, arriving at the fort
that summer, just months before the Marquis de Montcalm arrived with a force of 3000
men to lay siege to the fort and drive the British off the Great Lakes. Fort Oswego was
originally a trading post built on the shores of Lake Ontario, next to Wood Creek. Its east
and west were flanked by hills overlooking the blockhouse, leaving the
fort indefensible.
Rather than build a new fort and abandon Oswego, William Shirley ordered
that
supporting fortifications be built on both hills, Fort Ontario and
the new Fort Oswego,
later known to the men as Fort Rascal. These fortifications were to act
as satellites to the
central fort, which was protected solely by a rampart on its
landward side. The old fort at
Oswego was completely unprotected where it touched the lake
and the river. All
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fortifications were in disrepair because the British regulars who occupied the area for the
winter of 1755, the 50
th
and 51 st Regiments of Foot, had barely survived starvation. Over
the winter and into the spring, the main supply route to the forts had become choked off
by ice and then by French-allied Indian war parties who had burned down Fort Bull. Fort
Bull was the supply center that straddled the Great Carrying Place between the
headwaters of the Mohawk River and Wood Creek. Lieutenant Colonel Bradstreet was
finally sent with 300 bateau men he had trained to fight, who drove off the Indians and
re-supplied Fort Oswego in June. 53
When Montcalm arrived, he decided to invest Fort Ontario first. He built a trench
within a few hundred yards of the east wall, under the cover of a small ridge, and soon
began pounding the wooden palisades to dust. The British quickly retreated to Fort
Oswego and soon twelve large cannon were pointed down at the blockhouse. Lieutenant
Colonel Mercer, the regular British officer in charge of the fort, ordered his cannon to fire
back at Fort Ontario despite the hopelessness of his situation because his honor
demanded it. 54
On the Appearance ofDay light our Morning Gun was fired as usual, But A Shot
Put in it, and pointed to Fort Ontario, Concluding the Enemy to be there; we were
immediately answered by 12 Shot. . Upon which, our Guns were Briched
about all that Coild be Brot to Bear, and as Severe A Cannonade on Both
Sides' as Perhaps Ever was, until about 10 o'clock, about this time we
Discovered
the Enemy, in Great Numbers, Crossing the River; and we not in force
Sufficient
to go up and oppose them, and being Judged not safe, any longer,
to Keep the
Men in Fort Raskel, that was evacuated; and we all were Huddled together,
in
and about the Main Fort, the Comadent, Coll Manser, about this time was
killed
by a Cannon Ball; thus the man who this week had the lives of valuable
men in
53 Anderson, Crucible of War, p. 136-41, 150-4.
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It was this concept of professional honor that both
Mercer and Montcalm adhered to which caused Cross'
loSrmentSg the war. Montcalm did not believe that the fort fought long enough to deserve
rekasTbSc toSnd and so he had all the men taken prisoner, a decision winch resulted m the deaths
^SS^ment of many by the Indians who, disappointed m a lack of fighting, took what spoils
they
could among the prisoners.
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his hands, and would not extend Mercy to them, now had not time, not even to
sue for his own life. .
.
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Lieutenant Colonel Mercer was beheaded by that cannon ball and his death put
Lieutenant Colonel John Littlehales in charge, who promptly surrendered. Since the
British did not defend their position long enough, in the professional opinion of
Montcalm, all soldiers and civilians were taken prisoner and those that survived the night
marched up to Canada the next day. 56
The part of Cross' narrative which is most interesting is his condemnation of
Mercer. Cross was not upset with Mercer's decision to fight the French, despite the odds.
Courage and honorable conduct was expected on the battlefield by both British and
American soldiers. Cross hated Mercer for something he had done the previous week,
before the French had been discovered. On the ninth of August, just a week before the
siege, Mercer had brought two American soldiers to justice in the British tradition.
Several soldiers from both Pepperell's and Shirley's regiments had been caught deserting.
As was usual under the British Articles of War, one man from each regiment was selected
as an example and sentenced to death. Five days after they were found guilty the men
were shot in front of their regiments, despite the pleas from the colonial officers
that
Governor Shirley be notified and given a chance to grant a reprieve.
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It was Mercer's
refusal to bear challenge to his authority that earned him the righteous hatred
of all the
colonial troops. American soldiers expected to be punished for deserting,
and flogging
55 Stephen Cross, Sarah E. Mulliken, ed., "Journal of Stephen
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was not uncommon among colonial outfits (though not to the severity usual in the British
Army), but the death penalty was deemed cruel. New England colonials expected their
officers to lead them, not coerce them, and few colonial officers wished to tell their
neighbor that he had ordered their son's death.
Further proof of this sense of community among the officers and their men can be
found in their shared religious practices. The journals and memoirs that survive
recounting colonial experiences in the French and Indian Wars mention which Psalm was
discussed during sermon and who gave it. During these times, officers and men were
expected to be treated as equal in the eyes of God and to act accordingly. Often, the
Sabbath preacher would be a private and every man was expected to listen and hear the
Word of God. Cross, on his way up to Fort Oswego wrote, ". . .attended Worship where a
Common Soldier by the name of Williamson Preached I believe a Good Man made many
Good observations and good admonitions and councills. . ."
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According to the orderly
book of Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia, kept by Sergeant Josiah Perry in 1759, "Prayers
are to be attended daily at 9 o'clock, A.M. by all the men in garrison off duty. Divine
service to be attended every Sunday by all the garrison off duty - 1 1 A.M."
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This
congregation of soldiers as equals was so ingrained in the Massachusetts' colonial
mindset that Rufus Putnam, writing about all of his war experiences after the
Revolution,
was moved to complain in his memoirs, "Captain Learned prayed with his Company
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Morning and evening, and on the Sabbath read a Sermon. (Oh! how the times have
changed.)"60
This expectation of shared religious observation separated further the colonials
from the British redcoats. British officers would never have shared the same religious
meeting with the enlisted men, if they ever attended a sermon at all. When the British
officers did deign to attend colonial services, it was usually for an expressed purpose.
Following the British defeat at Ticonderoga in 1758, Lieutenant Colonel Bradstreet
convinced General Abercrombie to allow an expedition of colonials, lead by Brigadier
Stanwix and Bradstreet, to attack Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario as a remedy for lost
British honor. Though Bradstreet enjoyed the sympathy of his men because of his
participation at Louisbourg in 1745 and his relief of Fort Oswego in 1756, the colonial
troops were unhappy with Abercrombie and distrustful of Stanwix. They were beginning
to desert and the colonial officers were not, in Stanwix' s mind, enforcing discipline with
enough vigor. For this reason, the Brigadier decided to bring his entire compliment of
regular officers to Sunday sermon, an act that was cause for noting in the journal of one
of the regimental chaplains, Daniel Shute.
Sunday Mr. Spencer, New York Chaplain, preached 1 1 Chron 32 v. Gen Stanwix
and ye Regular officers present. In his address to them acknowledged their great
goodness in coming to N. America with such noble views, and the Disingenuity
of ye people in failing to make them grateful returns. And after discanting awhile
on their wonted Lenity in discipline, advised them to more vigorous measures
to
prevent deserting.
The sarcasm of this religious man is hard to miss. Shute and the rest of
the colonials
were insulted that the British officers would interrupt their prayers
and use the pulpit to
Putnam, p. 11.
Shute, p. 140.
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denounce colonial military practices. Sermons were not a forum for reinforcing military
hierarchies; they were a forum for all men to humble themselves before God. Stanwix's
action was inexcusable.
Such expectations of leadership, of humility and courage, did not come solely
from the lower ranks. They also came from an egalitarian society that all Massachusetts'
soldiers, enlisted and commissioned alike, were a part. Condemnation for failure to meet
these expectations came from both below and from peers. For example, Rufus Putnam
wrote the passage quoted above concerning Captain Learned and his attendance of
service with his men as a memoir composed after his service during the Revolution in
which he was commissioned as a general. His views, therefore, were a mixture of
memories as a private soldier informed by his later experiences as an officer. Yet the
most compelling example of the expectations of colonial officers among themselves
comes from Seth Pomeroy following the Battle of Lake George.
Pomeroy was second-in-command of Ephraim Williams' regiment. Following
Williams' death in the initial ambush between Lake George and Fort Edward, Pomeroy
led the remnants of the regiment in the defense of the encampment under Phineas
Lyman
following General Johnson's retirement with a wound to the buttock. Once the powder
smoke had cleared, however, Williams' replacement became a more political
question.
Though Pomeroy was second in the chain of command while Williams was alive,
he was
not the most senior lieutenant colonel present among the Massachusetts'
provincial army.
Johnson held a council ofwar to determine whether to promote
from within each
regiment that had lost officers or to promote by seniority.
The decision was made to
promote by seniority and Lt. Col. Thomas Gilbert, of Taunton,
was promoted pro
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tempore to succeed Williams until Johnson had received official orders from the
governor.
This decision to place the regiment comprised mostly of Hampshire men, under
the command of an outsider did not sit well with the rank and file of the regiment.
According to the editor of Pomeroy's journal, Louis Effingham de Forest, the enlisted
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men had petitioned Johnson for the promotion of Pomeroy to command. ' When an
officer from another regiment, and another county, was sent instead, the men staged a
small revolt of their own. Pomeroy wrote that " . . one night Some Person Took it (the
regimental colors) away & Set it up whare it aut to be at Colo Williams Tent Gilbart In ye
morning brought It back & Said yt he had rathar they had took his head off "63 This
incident shows that Pomeroy's dislike of Gilbert did not stem from the fact that he was
not from Hampshire County. For Pomeroy, and the other officers in the regiment,
Gilbert's reaction to the prank was a telling statement of Gilbert's character. According
to Pomeroy, Gilbert was "Famos Insulting", a man who craved promotion and foolishly
placed his entire honor in a flag, "So much upon his Shame'
Within two weeks of Johnson's pro tempore promotions, written orders arrived
from Boston. The acting governor, Spencer Phips, decided to bend to local political
pressures and promote the officers from within the regiments. Petitions had
arrived from
Northampton, complaining against the decision of Johnson's war council to
promote
from without the Hampshire regiment, and perhaps at the urgings of
Col. Israel Williams
the governor promoted Pomeroy in order to retain the continued
support of the county's
64
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representatives in the General Council. Pomeroy and his soldiers were all too happy to
send Gilbert packing. In fact, Gilbert was so enraged he left the campaign entirely and
returned home. Pomeroy invited all the officers in the regiment to his headquarters for a
celebratory drink to toast the end of "Gilbard & Tirony" much to the "univertial
Sattisfaction with ye officers".
65
Instead of accepting the promotion of an officer from outside the regiment, the
colonial soldiers of Massachusetts believed they had the right to decide who should
succeed their previous commander. And more importantly for this instant, the officers
believed it as well. Seth Pomeroy was almost certainly disappointed not to have been
immediately promoted to colonel by Johnson. After all, he had served with distinction at
Louisbourg in 1745 and continued to serve defending the frontier between the two wars.
He had been passed over for Ephraim Williams to command the regiment initially
because of Williams' higher reputation and kinship ties in the county but he was second-
in-command. Furthermore, Gilbert only outranked Pomeroy by two days! Yet neither
Pomeroy' s journal entries nor any of his letters home indicate that jealousy was the cause
of his concern. Rather, he and his men, officers and enlisted alike, disagreed
with the
decision to place an officer in command who was not selected from within and who
placed himself above those in his command.
Ibid , p. 124.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LEADERSHIP IN ACTION
For two hundred years, European powers competed with one another over the rich
cod fisheries off the eastern coast of Canada. Competition took various forms from the
piracy of privateers to outright combat between imperial navies. To support their fishing
fleets, France and England each established ports along the Canadian coast and English
Harbor on Cape Breton Island, or Havre a 1' Anglais, was the one harbor that did not
completely freeze over in the winter. Its narrow opening to the sea had a small island in
its center. This port was retained by the French in the Treaty ofUtrecht in 1713, though
the rest of Acadia was ceded to the English and became Nova Scotia. The French
understood that its position was economically desirable and strategically important to the
protection of her North American possessions because of its proximity to the mouth of
the St. Lawrence River. Therefore, in 1720, the government of Louis XV began to pay
for a stone fortress to be built around the town known to the French as Louisbourg.
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The fortress at Louisbourg was planned and built by two French military
engineers, first Verville and then Verrier, based upon the tenets established
by Vauban.
Situated among the natural protections of swamps and the rocky coast,
its stone walls
were thick though not continuous; there was a gap on the
harbor side where there was a
pond. The harbor itself was large enough for French naval
vessels to maneuver within
while its entrance was protected by the Island Battery
constructed in the mouth of the
^T,^"^ to a Continent, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 1-10.
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channel. A final artillery fortification, the Grand Battery, was built a mile to the
northeast to defend the Island Battery or the fort against attack.67
While the presence of the fort was of concern to the English, their fishing vessels
stationed at Canseau continued to infringe upon French interests. In retaliation, the
French governor at Louisbourg in 1744 detached his soldiers to destroy the English
settlement. This attack, combined with the initiation of the War of the Austrian
Succession in the American colonies, was used by the Massachusetts governor, William
Shirley, to begin a campaign against the French fort in the spring of 1745. Shirley
enlisted the help of the other New England colonies to produce a provincial army of 4000
men under the command of William Pepperrell from Maine. Shirley convinced his
patrons in London that the attack was plausible if he had the aid of the British Navy and
Commodore Sir Peter Warren was dispatched from the West Indies with his squadron.
Meanwhile, Shirley gathered a flotilla of colonial privateers to transport his army north to
68
Canseau, a former British fort destroyed the year before.
When the colonial forces arrived at the destroyed fort, they re-fortified their
position and began to drill. Their scouts discovered that the French harbor was still
choked with ice, forcing the provincials to wait and drill for three weeks. On April 13,
1745, the British Navy arrived and, after a council ofwar with Pepperrell, Commodore
Warren left to blockade Cape Breton. Though the French were aware of a renewed
English presence south of Louisbourg, Governor Du Chambon assumed the force only
capable of rebuilding Canseau. For this reason, he directed
reinforcements from Quebec,
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under the command of Lieutenant Pierre-Paul Marin de la Malgue, to march on
Annapolis Royal in the belief that forces at Canseau were not a threat. In addition, Du
Chambon did not send word to France requesting naval support.69
When the English forces arrived on April 23, the Grand Battery was in disrepair.
Money had not been forthcoming from the Crown for needed work on the walls and a
near mutiny the year before had resulted in little work conducted where it was most
needed. When the British vessels began their initial bombardment, Captain Chassin de
Thierry, commander of the Grand Battery, determined the position untenable and
recommended the guns be spiked and the battery abandoned. Du Chambon agreed and
the guns were left without ever firing a shot. With naval support, Pepperrell began an
amphibious assault three miles from the fortress, landing at Fresh Water Cove and
defeating a group of eighty French soldiers. The victory allowed him to disembark 2000
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men near the fort over two days.
Directly after the landing, 13 men scouted around the rear of the fortress to locate
the Grand Battery and assess its disposition. The men found the fort abandoned and
quickly waved their comrades inside. The French, realizing that they had not done
enough to destroy their own guns, detached a force to re-take the battery. It was too little
too late. Pepperrell, notified in advance, dispatched his own soldiers who repelled the
French attack. Gunsmiths, led by Major Seth Pomeroy, arrived to repair the French
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artillery and by the next morning the bombardment of Louisbourg had begun.
Ibid., p. 65-72.
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The English forces then began to unload their own artillery and mortars on to the
beach. They realized there was high ground overlooking the fortress less than a mile
from the walls, a position known to the French but assumed to be swampy enough to
deter any enemy from emplacing guns there. Pepperrell appreciated the necessity of an
artillery emplacement there and managed, after four days of continuous hauling, to
navigate the marsh with stone sledges. He placed the guns above the town and began a
72
second artillery attack.
For the next two weeks Louisbourg endured shelling from two positions. Though
the walls sustained severe damage, they did not fall and neither position was close
enough to allow English mortars to bomb the inside of the fort. Pepperrell and Warren
became concerned as their stores of ammunition and powder were depleted. Warren was
unable to defeat or destroy the Island Battery and still could not enter the harbor. Then
the French frigate Vigilant arrived to re-supply the fortress. Warren managed to capture
her before she could run the blockade and, for a while, English concerns over supplies
were abated. The Island Battery still remained the key to capturing the French fortress,
however, as an assault on Louisbourg was deemed impossible without the close support
of the British naval guns.
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Spurred on by concerns that more French vessels were en route, Pepperrell
planned an assault on the Island Battery. The assault was conducted
under the cover of
night with the soldiers landing on the small island without
incident. The problem was the
indiscipline and amateurism of the provincials, a factor so
prominent in the writings of
British contemporaries and modern historians alike. A drunken soldier
let out a war cry
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just as they were about to scale the undefended walls of the battery. Alerted, the French
soldiers manned their posts and repelled the attackers after a two hour fight that ended
with over 180 English casualties. Another method would have to be found to destroy the
Island Battery.
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Soon after the failed attack on the battery fort, under the pretense that English
captives had been mistreated, Pepperrell sent an officer to Louisbourg with a letter from
the French officers of the Vigilant, describing their good treatment. The British officer
complained against French mistreatment of English captives and awaited Du Chambon's
reply. Unbeknownst to the French, this English officer spoke French and he was able to
ascertain that Du Chambon had not known the Vigilant was captured. The realization
that supplies would not arrive sorely tested French morale. A subsequent capture of a
French vessel from Acadia warned the English that Captain Marin, having failed to
destroy Annapolis Royal, was marching on Canseau. He planned to kill the English
soldiers stationed there and then relieve Du Chambon at Louisbourg by attacking the
English from their rear. Pepperrell dispatched soldiers on two colonial privateers who
arrived at Canseau before Marin. Gathering three other ships and the soldiers there, the
English surprised Marin's force as it was crossing the channel to the English fort and
destroyed them in the water.
75 The intelligence gained by both the capture of French
ships and the subterfuge of colonial officers became pivotal to English success.
Warren and Pepperrell then decided to move some of their artillery to
the
Lighthouse Point, overlooking the Island Battery. Some colonials had
discovered ten
French artillery pieces sunk in shallow water in the bay and,
combined with English
74
Ibid., p. 93-5.
75
Ibid., p. 93-8.
50
mortars, the English built an emplacement less than a mile from the last existing French
battery. Soon mortar bombs were lobbed within the walls, destroying the magazine.
This was the final straw for Du Chambon and the French were forced to surrender.
While the English commanders held a council of war to plan their assault on the fortress
proper, an assault Seth Pomeroy feared ". . .in all human Probibility Prov'd Fatal To our
76 77
army & Destroy' d a grate Part ofym . . ."
,
the French suddenly surrendered.
It would seem that this assault was doomed from the start. The French fortress,
manned by professional French soldiers and Swiss mercenaries, was the strongest on the
continent. The attacking force was provincial (and so rag tag) and the officers that led it
largely inexperienced. Only three weeks were given to drill and most of the artillery men
learned their trade through trial and error. Although a part of the English success can be
attributed to Du Chambon' s oversights and underestimation of English intent, the details
of the battle show that a greater part of responsibility lay with the English leaders.
Despite some historians' claims that Pepperrell's plan was to immediately assault the
fortress walls
78
,
in fact the colonial leadership made many sound decisions during the
siege. Reconnaissance was critical in determining when to start the attack, discovering
that the Grand Battery was undefended, and realizing that Canseau had to be defended
against incoming French forces. Artillery placement was key to the battle and
Pepperrell
and his officers were determined to establish those positions despite the
difficulties
involved. Soldiers had to haul the guns themselves because no draft
animals had been
brought. Certainly, this was an oversight in planning but the
military leadership
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necessary to motivate those soldiers in the swamp was astounding. For four days,
officers and privates alike pulled artillery pieces weighing several tons on stone sledges,
sometimes resulting in a broken leg or arm when a soldier became stuck in the mud and
was crushed by the sleds. Yet the officers maintained their determination and their
soldiers did not quit. Furthermore, despite Commodore Warrens' pressures in repeated
councils of war, Pepperrell resisted the urge to order a suicidal frontal attack on the walls
of Louisbourg until all other pieces were in place to allow the greatest chance for success.
General Abercrombie would not be as patient twelve years later.
There is no doubt mistakes were made during the campaign. Supplies were slow
in coming from Boston, forcing New England soldiers to rely on captured French
supplies. Clothing and shelter became a problem and disease took its toll. Most glaring
of all was the failed mission to capture the Island Battery by raid at night. The campaign
as a whole, however, was successful. The colonials held together as a unit for a two-
month siege that required many separate successes to be accomplished. The British Navy
made the siege possible through their blockade and with captured intelligence but it was
the artillery positions that won the day, not naval guns. In this instance, at
least, the
colonies ofNew England, led by Massachusetts, had proven that they could be victorious
on the battlefield.
Despite this victory in the realm of regular warfare by a New England provincial
army, some historians do not agree that they were effective; the
battle at Louisbourg was
an exception to the rule. Particularly, Guy Chet has produced a
well researched book,
Conquering the Wilderness, in which he argues that there was
nothing new or particularly
successful militarily occurring in New England through the Seven
Years' War. Instead,
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the colonial armies of Massachusetts and New York deteriorated over the course of 150
years from King Philip's War to 1755 and British intervention was necessary to defeat
France. Chet agrees with Stanley Pargellis, among other historians of the period, that
focus must be paid to British forces in the colonies if one is to understand how colonial
military institutions were formed. In other words, there was no viable "Americanization"
of tactics or logistics (and therefore leadership) in the New England colonies, no
79
American exceptionalism.
Two other historians have written to refute this position by claiming that New
Englanders had developed a viable military institution but that it was one designed to
fight the petite guerre or irregular warfare. Steven Charles Eames argues that previous
historians have presented a skewed portrait of northern colonial forces as incompetent
because they focused on major events and tended to favor the contemporary opinions of
the professionals of the era, in other words British officers. According to Eames, colonial
forces were successful when they used guerrilla tactics and conducted raids and
ambushes designed to surprise the enemy and destroy property. This type of limited,
unconventional warfare was necessary to defeat Indian forces and the French who
favored these tactics as well. Furthermore, when the results of both French and colonial
major campaigns are compared from 1690 to 1748, New England fairs quite well.
During this time, New England, led by the colony of Massachusetts, planned nine large-
scale operations. Three of these were successful, two were failures, and
four were
cancelled due to weather or lack of funds. By comparison, the French attempted
four, of
which one never passed the planning stage, one was cancelled, and two
failed. Finally,
the British officer corps understood warfare through the
lens of class. All enlisted
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soldiers, including their own, were brutes incapable of reason. Once the British Army
took control of the North American theater in 1755, there was no other option but for the
British officers to take control. Colonial officers were little better than their men and so
were next to useless. Their actual abilities on the battlefield were irrelevant. When seen
from this perspective, Braddock's decisions become obvious and British military
80
professional opinion becomes suspect.
John Grenier also takes the position that colonial forces had developed a distinct
form of warfare through his examination of irregular warfare and ranger units on the
American frontier For Grenier, regular warfare incorporated limited war with decisive
victory that was characteristic of European battles in this era. In the American colonies,
however, there was not the infrastructure or the necessity to wage war in this manner.
Instead, a particularly violent form ofpetite guerre, one which combined unlimited war
with attrition, evolved that incorporated scalp hunting and ranging to extirpate Indian
populations.
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Again, previous historians were blind to American successes because they
tended to focus on professional armies and regular warfare. In fact, European armies of
the era had experience in irregular tactics. Among the French, such tactics were
incorporated into the professional structure under Marshal Grand-Maison, who wrote a
treatise on the subject. The British Army had a less favorable view of guerrilla tactics,
however. While the methods of the petite guerre were utilized in Scotland and
Ireland,
such tactics were viewed as criminal, used only when necessary against criminal
elements. Irregular warfare was distasteful and to be avoided when not
needed. For that
reason, irregular forces were not institutionalized in the
British Army prior to the Seven
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Years' War and colonial units designed to fight in such a manner were scorned. 82 During
the Seven Years' War, however, American rangers were employed when the British
regulars began to understand that they were required if the British were to overcome the
hazards of fighting in the North American wilderness.
Grenier focuses upon ranger units to highlight the effectiveness of colonial forces,
both north and south, in their uses of irregular warfare. He contends that this "First Way
ofWar" was eventually incorporated into the institution of the US Army by the
nineteenth century. Combined with Eames' assertions that both regular and irregular
colonial forces were more successful than previously depicted, Guy Chet's argument
against a peculiar "American" system of combat effectiveness appears untenable. In fact,
the colonial armies ofNew England were successful for over a century in defeating both
Indian and French forces and a key element of that success was their development of a
military leadership that could direct volunteer soldiers without recourse to coercion.
Military leadership, tactics, and weapons all exist in relationship to one another.
Tactics evolve as technology changes the tools used on the battlefield. In many
instances, this happens with a lag time and the result is slaughter. In the American Civil
War, frontal assaults, like Picket's Charge at Gettysburg, doomed many more men than
necessary because that tactic, made unsupportable with the advent of mass-produced
rifles, quick-loading carbines, and improved artillery had not been changed
to meet the
realities of military technology. General James Longstreet is
rumored to have predicted
that only a defensive war, in trenches, could affectively
utilize the awesome firepower
possible by the 1860's. This came to pass, with even worse results,
in Europe from 1914
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1918. Finally, with the invention of the tank, and tactical evolutions at Sandhurst,
feasible offensive tactics of support by fire and maneuver allowed Allied forces to make
key breakthroughs and force Germany to surrender.
If tactics, then, are a function of weaponry, how is leadership a function of
tactics? In World War II, small unit leaders in the US Army had more autonomy than
ever before because tactics and technology determined that their decisions were
necessary to win the fight. No longer could generals sit atop the hill and move their
forces like chess pieces. Men moved in squad and platoon formations, requiring the
leadership of sergeants and lieutenants to clear houses and flank machinegun positions.
In the Philippines in 1945, a reinforced Ranger company was dispatched to rescue 500
prisoners of war taken by the Japanese after the defeat at Bataan. Though the battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci, was overall in charge of the expedition,
the planning and execution was left to the company commander, Captain Robert Prince.
84
Every Ranger was trained in the position above him because leadership down to the
fire team level was seen as essential to success.
In the British Army of the eighteenth century, leadership came in the form of
draconian discipline and strict hierarchy. The inaccuracy of muskets like the "Brown
Bess", combined with the ingenious new tool of the bayonet, demanded that
formations
remain in close order under fire, that soldiers reload standing despite
the carnage, and that
when given the command to charge, soldiers followed that command unflinchingly.
Yet
how would that picture look if the tools were changed? Soldiers in the
Massachusetts
provincial regiments did not carry bayonets until around 1758.
In fact, the hatchet was
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the melee weapon of choice. Bayonet charges were thought not to work well against an
enemy in the woods and formations were difficult to hold in close terrain. Though both
these assertions were tested during the Seven Years' War, in the battles of La Belle
Famille and Busy Run where bayonet charges did rout Indian forces, usually the enemy
fought in a dispersed manner not conducive to such tactics. As a rule, the enemy,
whether French or Indian, did not bring large forces into open fields and fight in the
conventional fashion of columns and files. Tactics were different in North America and,
along with a change in society in New England there came a change in military
leadership.
Leadership is, however, more complicated than simply a method for maneuvering
troops given a specific kit of combat technology. The most obvious, and recent,
juxtaposition to illustrate this point would be the Soviet bloc forces and the US forces in
the 1980's. Both nations had large land armies that utilized comparable rifles,
machineguns and tanks. Yet the leadership styles among these forces were quite
different, if comparably suited to the realities of modern warfare. While the US Army
adjusted to an all-volunteer force, training a professionalized non-commissioned officer
corps and retaining its method of teaching each soldier the job of the man above him, the
Soviet model was based on political hierarchy and the tactics of mass formations.
The
USSR decided to produce more equipment and utilize its large population to overwhelm
an opponent. Officers were selected for then political credentials
and soldiers were
conscripted. The result was a more centralized form of military leadership
that resulted,
often, in indecision once a platoon leader or company commander was
killed. What
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becomes clear is the way in which the society from within which a military institution is
created reflects the methods used by that military to lead soldiers.
This was certainly the case in the provincial armies ofNew England and though it
is more involved than simply the contractual concepts put forward by Fred Anderson, a
basic issue is whether it worked on the field of battle in the eighteenth century. Chet,
among other "supporters" of the British system, has argued that it did not. According to
Chet, the British Army won the war through superior logistics and transportation. He
tells us it was Lord Loundoun, with his attention to details and his creation of a
transportation corps in the North American colonies, which laid the foundations for
British success by 1760. Irregular tactics were not uncommon in Europe; they were
simply not utilized by British professional establishment. Instead, partisans and local
mercenaries were used to conduct raids and to gather intelligence. The problem in North
America was that the provincial armies were so bad at those tasks. Their undisciplined
soldiers and ineffective officers made dealing with colonials, for the British, too
inefficient and frustrating. The establishment of irregular and light infantry tactics, suited
to the colonial theater ofwar was, therefore, not an admission that British tactics should
change but a necessity. The provincials could not be trusted to do it themselves.
The weaknesses in Chefs argument about tactics and American units are two-
fold. He defines the tactics of the offensive too narrowly (and so wrongly defines the
tactics of the defensive) and he incorporates strategic maneuver with
tactical maneuver.
For Chet, a soldier or unit is only on the offensive if they are
moving forward. Under this
definition, the assault and the flanking maneuvers are the only real
offensive tactics of the
eighteenth century. Once a unit stopped, or utilized cover, that
unit was on the defensive.
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His definition of these terms would then place an ambush in the category of the
defensive, where the elements of surprise and audacity,86 are critical to success. It makes
more sense to consider a military operation as offensive or defensive in its characteristics,
planning, and objectives. If the defense embodies the characteristics of preparation,
security, disruption, massed effects, and flexibility, its purpose is to force the enemy to
attack under less than favorable conditions in order to re-gain the initiative. In contrast,
the characteristics of the offense (surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity) combine
initiative with maneuver to either destroy the enemy or seize terrain. In either case, it is
the objective that determines the type of operation and in many instances both sides can
be on the attack, though not both on the defense.
The intent here is not to write a presentist history of military doctrine. Rather,
this is an argument for enduring principles ofwar that define very concrete characteristics
evident in combat throughout history. In other words, while tactics change, operations
can defined as offensive or defensive utilizing the same definitions that apply today. The
variation in warfare comes from the different technologies and tactics employed to
accomplish these fundamentals and the leadership utilized to motivate soldiers on the
battlefield. It is these characteristics which Chet overlooks in his argument for the
dominance and success of the defense in European tactics during the eighteenth century
and weakens his argument against the viability of provincial troops in the theater of
war
during this period. Instead, the colonial tactics and leadership ofNew England
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incorporated both the offense and the defense, combined irregular warfare within a more
conventional structure, and evolved a leadership model that provided direction and
motivation to a largely all-volunteer force.
The imperial forces of both France and England brought with them certain
technological advances and definitely different ideas of how to wage warfare in North
America. The influx of professional European armies brought with it a desire to import
regular war into a theater in which irregular tactics had previously dominated. Primarily,
they imported a need for complex fortifications in the style of Vauban and therefore the
need for large contingents of artillery and mortars to invest those forts. What is seen
throughout the Seven Years' War are a series of battles, centered on European-style
fortresses, which required the building of roads and large logistics trains to support the
attacker's investment. British colonial forces adapted to these changing conditions of
war though the British Army decided not to use them to their capabilities for political and
social reasons.
At the Battle of Ticonderoga in 1758, General Abercromby assembled the largest
British force to date of 16,000 troops. His second-in-command, Lord Howe, led the
advanced guard north on Lake George, in front of 1000 vessels transporting the main
body of British and colonial troops. With him were the ranger companies of Major
Robert Rogers and a Massachusetts regiment under the command of Colonel Jedediah
Preble. They landed on the north shore of the lake, immediately attacking
French pickets
emplaced there. Among them was a sixteen-year-old private, David Perry
from
Rehoboth, Massachusetts. He described the first skirmish of the
battle.
"Major Rogers, with his Rangers was the first to land. He was joined by
Lord
Howe. ..It was the first engagement 1 had ever seen, and
the whistling of balls and
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roar of musquetry terrified me not a little. At length our regiment formed among
the trees behind which the men kept stepping from their ranks for shelter. Col.
Preble, who, I well remember, was a harsh man, swore he would knock the first
man down who should step out of his ranks which greatly surprised me, to think
that I must stand still to be shot at. . and when I came to see the blood run so
freely, it put new life into me. Lord Howe and a number of other good men were
killed."
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This first encounter as described by Private Perry is important for three reasons. First,
the rangers came on shore and successfully repelled the French pickets sent to disrupt the
British landing. Second, the Massachusetts regiment stood up under fire, despite the
instinct of many new recruits to hide behind cover. And third, Lord Howe, one of the
very few British officers respected by the New Englanders, was killed during the first
volleys of the battle.
Abercromby landed his full force soon after and, upon discovering the death of
Lord Howe, decided to wait for two days before attacking the French at Fort Carillon.
During that time, the Marquis de Montcalm, recently arrived from Quebec, began
furiously working his officers and men to build a breastwork in front of the dilapidated
fort. A trench was dug in front of a wall made of logs and sandbags. In front of this
defense, for as much as 100 yards or more, all the trees were cut down and left lying in a
tangle of limbs and stumps. The branches were sharpened like stakes and the entire
obstacle, called an abatis, formed an engagement area to trap assaulting enemy forces.
Abercromby attacked with little intelligence and, therefore, no artillery support.
He assumed that the ruinous condition of the fort would hinder French
resistance and that
his overwhelming force would prevail. The rangers and the provincial
light infantry
marched forward and took positions on the flanks and behind the
cover provided by the
abatis defenses as support for the frontal attack performed by
the regulars. Almost
89 David Perry. "The Life of David Perry". ThP Magazine of
History, 1928: 137. p. 9.
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immediately, the British formations were in shambles and, for the next eight hours, over
1500 soldiers lost their lives in those trees. As Archelaus Fuller, a soldier in Colonel
Timothy Bagely's regiment, recounts from his position behind a log,
"But before the Reagelers came up the fier began very hot the Regalors hove
down thair pak and fixed their bayarnits came up in order stod and fit very
coragerly our men droed up very ner and was ordered to make a stand the fit
came on very smart it held about eaght ours a sorefiill Sit to behold the Ded men
and wounded Lay on the ground hauing Som ofthem legs thir arms and other
Lims broken others shot threw the body and very mortly wounded to hear thar
cris and se thair bodis lay in blod. .."
Indeed, wave after wave of British regiments were flung into the kill zone created by the
French without any soldier making the breastwork itself. David Perry's regiment was
there as well, to support the assault though he was not able to raise his head long enough
to fire. One of his comrades "raised his head a little above the log, and a ball struck him
in the center of the forehead, and tore his scalp back to the crown
"91
Finally, with the
coming of nightfall, the British regulars retired and the provincials finally left for the
boats. Rumors the French and Indians were in pursuit turned retreat into a rout as
thousands of British soldiers fought to be the first on the lake headed back to the burnt
shell of Fort William Henry .
The Battle of Ticonderoga was the greatest British defeat of the war, along with
Monongahela. Without doubt, the defeat lay solely in the decision by Abercromby
not to
move his artillery to the high ground and shell the fort into submission.
The importance
of the battle in regards to the caliber of the provincial soldiers
is that it shows us colonial
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soldiers under heavy fire for hours at a time who did not crumble or flee. Some
provincials, like Rufiis Putnam, volunteered to go forward rather than appear cowards in
front of their friends. These soldiers were certainly not drilled into a disciplined force
in any manner that would have been recognized by their British, or French, counterparts.
Yet they followed their officers and noncommissioned officers into a hellish scenario and
did not withdraw until nightfall.
The doctrinal weaknesses in Chefs thesis that concern tactics and focus on
conventional warfare weaken his interpretation of colonial forces, both in the regiments
and in the ranger companies. To better judge the effectiveness of the rangers and
regiments, a historian must analyze their purpose, what they were designed to
accomplish. The rangers were organized to infiltrate, to destroy property through raids,
and to bring back intelligence. They were successful at Ticonderoga when they defeated
the French pickets. Furthermore, Grenier's book highlights ranger units led by Ben
Church, John Gorham, Robert Rogers and others in their successful campaigns from the
94
western frontier of Massachusetts to Nova Scotia.
The provincial regiments were light infantry. When these units were used for
their intended purposes, such as their supporting role during the final assaults at
Ticonderoga, the colonials did not break, they did not falter. The bias of British
officers
has, however, lasted through the twentieth century. For these
professionals the colonials
were rabble, without honor, men who could not emulate the model of eighteenth-century
warfare (ie. The British Army). Chet asserts that partisans in Europe
(local fighting units
93 Putnam, p. 24.
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utilized by the British Army in the European theater to perform military operations
deemed distasteful to professional officers) made a professional light infantry
unnecessary before the Seven Years' War and colonial incompetence changed that
model. Instead, what is important is that the British Army had never attempted to
incorporate partisans into their institution before and their insistence that colonial troops
act like British soldiers often placed these units in situations for which they were not
th
designed. When the British did create a regiment for ranging, the 80 of Foot, it failed
due to Thomas Gage's insistence on patronage among his officers and Rogers' was
placed back in command of British ranger operations. 95
Throughout the war, and the previous colonial conflicts, few men involved in the
provincial armies were ever professional. Some were definitely life-long soldiers.
Ephraim Williams served his colony as a military officer for most of his adult life. Seth
Pomeroy was not only involved in campaigns of both King George's War and the Seven
Years' War but also commanded a fort on the frontier between conflicts. Rufus Putnam
rose from private to general in the Revolutionary War. Though these men, and many like
them, fought for their colony and their country all of their lives, they were not
professionalized in the conventional sense. They did not attend schools such as
Woolwich or, later, Sandhurst. They did not earn their livings solely in uniform. Though
many officers had experiences ofwar before attaining their higher ranks, some, like
William Pepperrell, were promoted to higher command based on their social status. Yet
even that example has its extenuating circumstance since there was no one
with the
required experience in Massachusetts at the time to lead the
expedition to Louisbourg.
95 Grenier,p. 115-45.
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Instead, Pepperrell's impeccable reputation was deemed the most important quality to
instill public confidence in the operation and to encourage voluntary enlistments.
96
For
the large majority of officers, their experience of war over decades gave them the
knowledge to fight and to lead. They learned drill, tactics, and discipline from both the
British Army and from trial and error. They had to modify what they were taught by the
professionals of the age to suit their particular social situation. And they had soldiers
who were not strangers to violence.
Barry Levy, in his paper "Boston Sports: Masculine Play and the Growth of a
Maritime City, 1640-1790", relates how violence was sanctioned within the school
systems of both Boston and Salem In the rough and deadly world of eighteenth-century
merchant marines, physical toughness and leadership was necessary to survival at sea.
Boys and young men created their own hierarchy based upon the strong in which fighting
and hazing was the norm. Gangs existed that fought each other for honor each Pope's
Day with fists and clubs and pipes. These Massachusetts communities closed themselves
to strangers and cultivated their own leaders through a system of "play" as Levy has
explained it.
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The reading ofjournals from the soldiers in this era might appear surreal to some
Often the descriptions of battle are clinical and devoid of trauma. Of course, many were
written years after the facts related, memoirs designed to prove that the soldier in
question had served in war and was entitled to a pension. This is not the case with
all of
them and some of the information gathered came from letters written only days
after,
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letters meant to inform family members back home that a loved one had died. Though
many ofthese men were quite young (David Perry was only sixteen when he first
enlisted), they often bore up well under the strains of combat. Perhaps their upbringing
could explain some of this. That could also help illuminate more reasons why the
leadership of the provincials in Massachusetts was based less on class and more on
reputation.
The life-long experiences of war in the colonies, specifically along the western
frontier ofNew England, accustomed men to violence. The leaders of these forces were
no different. They came from the same towns and communities. They sometimes served
first as privates and sergeants. They learned their trade through experience, sometimes to
good effect and sometimes not. Yet they had managed, prior to 1756, to maintain their
borders against the French and French-allied Indians and even capture a fortress the likes
of Louisbourg. The introduction of large numbers of imperial forces, both British and
French, fundamentally altered the methods by which war was waged. This climate of
change forced the colonials to alter their tactics somewhat, by extending enlistments,
defending more forts, and enforcing stronger discipline. It also forced the British Army
to change, creating a light infantry regiment that reloaded kneeling down and fired from
behind trees. But neither institution changed their system of officership or their methods
of leadership. In this area of military culture, among others, the two communities
found
their fundamental difference which Fred Anderson has identified as a source of
separation for another time.
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CONCLUSION
The nature of military leadership and tactics has been debated for millennia. Sun
Tzu wrote The Art of War to teach his student, the Emperor, how best to defeat the
enemies of China. Likewise, Machiavelli attempted to teach the prince of Florence
strategies that would protect his land from the encroachments of the French. Carl von
Clausewitz argued that war should be viewed as an extension of politics while his
contemporary, Henri de Jomini wrote his Art of War to expose the secrets of Napoleon's
tactical successes while securing his promotion within the Russian Army. This is an
ongoing dialogue that is as important for what it tells us about the tactics utilized
throughout history as it is for the universal principles these writers propose as the
foundations of their works.
Part of this dialogue in the present and immediate past has concerned the
difficulties faced by a democracy that wages war. Niall Ferguson wrote Colossus
recently as his answer to the American problem of Iraq. For him, democracies are
inefficient and so wage war uneconomically. Furthermore, because of their republican
nature wars cannot be drawn out. The electorate will eventually grow tired of the costs,
in taxes and lives, and the political will to accomplish the objectives will wither away.
The answer to this universal problem within the immediate context is to convince the
American people that liberal empire, a system in which American hegemony is not only
recognized but openly promoted to provide world stability, is necessary. If American
political elites could convince the American public of this, perhaps a total war
concept
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could be utilized to defeat worldwide terrorism. 98 This would mean fighting the Global
War on Terrorism as ifwe were fighting World War II again.
This idea that democratic societies are not well made for war is not new. There
are many examples of wars whose outcomes turned more on political will than tactical
ability. Though this author tends to agree with Clausewitz, that war is politics by another
means, what do these debates say about how democracies function within the institutions
used to wage war? Soldiers who voluntarily enlist in military service, men and women
who have been raised to believe that their opinion has national and international
importance through their vote, will be willing to submit to military discipline only so far.
They will not enlist for life. They will not submit to draconian punishment. They will
not accept orders based solely upon the class or status of their superiors. It seems that
they will become very inefficient soldiers.
Such soldiers need leadership. While they learn discipline and combat skills, they
will always require direction, motivation, and purpose if they are to succeed. If they
come from a society in which they expect to rise economically and socially, or at least
assume their right to do so, they will only volunteer to serve in a military with an
authority structure based upon merit, not class. Though these factors all seem to be
stumbling blocks to an effective military, they are actually the impetus for success. The
demands of a democratic society necessitate innovations in military structure. Officers
become more involved in all aspects of their soldiers' lives and must earn the respect of
those they lead. Noncommissioned officers must become as professional as
their officers
and gain the same reputations for leadership and loyalty. Soldiers
must be taught the
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requirements of those above them and be given the opportunity for promotion based on
merit. Authority becomes decentralized which, while requiring more communication and
risking a certain degree of inefficiency, also promotes initiative at the lowest levels and
allows for quick replacement of those wounded or killed.
The provincial armies of Massachusetts exhibited many of these traits throughout
their history as colonial forces and even into the first battles of the American Revolution.
Their greatest success came in 1745 at Louisbourg. Yet even after that, their military
system continued to function though it had to adapt quite quickly to changes imported by
the great empires through which the conflict of the Seven Years' War was really fought.
Some officers, like Ephraim Williams and Seth Pomeroy, were commissioned because
their standings within their communities allowed their ability to recruit. Others, like
Rufus Putnam, rose to the rank of general by the onset of the Revolution from the lowly
position of private through a lifetime of service. Soldiers who volunteered for campaigns
year after year rose in rank as their reputations and experience grew. The fact that rank
often followed ability to recruit led to the need for officers soldiers would follow. New
England was a fragmented democratic society. Within the towns, election was the rule in
both government and church. Though this democratic ideal was not so strong at the
county or provincial levels, the soldiers within the New England colonies enlisted often
under local leaders, those they selected themselves through the act of enlistment.
Outsiders, however, could not expect the same treatment. Strangers were
distrusted and
shunned, so the structure of the military also involved election and
reputation.
The system of the citizen soldier was effective as well. It was effective
enough tc
defeat the French at Louisbourg. Admittedly, during the
Seven Years' War, fewer
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opportunities were presented for this fact to be proven in a conventional fight while the
British establishment continued to relegate most provincials to the tasks of road clearing
and fortification repairs. By 1763, British officers still viewed colonials as good for little
more than some specific, and ethically questionable, irregular fighting and certainly no
match for professionals in a conventional battle. For the British officer, a system which,
in the northern colonies, relied upon renewed enlistments every year and encouraged
loose relationships between officers and enlisted soldiers could never compare well
against professional, standing armies where cultured, educated superiors controlled
disciplined, unthinking subordinates. Yet the beginnings of the American Revolution
would give lie to their assumptions and prejudice.
At the Battle of Bunker Hill on in June 1775, Massachusetts forces could only
loosely be termed an army. Artemus Ward, a veteran of Ticonderoga, was given
command of all forces by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts (though probably
more for his political connections with the country party than for his actions in the French
and Indian War) but each regiment fought quite separately. In fact, Israel Putnam, in
command of his Connecticut regiment, spent most of the battle around Bunker Hill (not
Breed's Hill were most of the fighting occurred) trying to coordinate both newly arrived
forces and some semblance of a reserve. Despite much confusion that resulted from the
ad hoc formation of troops and a lack oipotitieal coordination by the Provincial
Congress, Col. William Prescott mounted a defense on Breed's Hill that repelled
the
British regulars twice and resulted in a victory so costly to the British
that they were
eventually forced to abandon Boston, following the arrival of artillery
from Fort
Ticonderoga. With him in the redoubt on the hill was Maj. Gen. Joseph
Warren who
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refused to take over from Prescott because he had not received his formal commission
from the Congress yet. He fought as a volunteer private. To begin the assault, Maj. Gen.
William Howe directed his light infantry against the American left flank while sending
his regulars in a frontal assault of the redoubt on Breed's Hill. Captain Thomas
Knowlton of Connecticut and Col. John Stark ofNew Hampshire were defending the left
flank behind a fence and stone wall, effectively destroying every British attempt to
overrun their position. On the third attempt, the British regulars gained the redoubt on
the hill, though they were never able to flank the position, largely because the American
forces ran out of ammunition. The Americans fought a rear guard action hand-to-hand
with the British out of the earthen fort and, with the support of a company that had
remained in the flaming Charlestown and the forces still defending the fence and wall on
the American left flank, withdrew across Charlestown Neck to Cambridge."
Though Richard Ketchum, writing in the early 1970's, characterized the
American force as untested farmers,
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in reality many of the leaders and soldiers had
fought previously in the colonial wars. Seth Pomeroy fought as a private on the
American left flank that repelled General Howe's light infantry and regular forces. Col.
Ebenezer Learned, the former captain who led his company into desertion, was the first to
enter Boston after the British left. Though the British finally forced the American
withdrawal on their third assault, casualties were staggering for the attackers. Of the
almost 2300 soldiers involved, 1054 were killed or wounded.
101 American casualties
99 Richard M. Ketchum, Decisive Day: The Battlefor Bunker Hill,
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.
1973), p. 137-84.
100
Ibid., p. 1H-2.
101
Ibid., p. 190.
71
were also high at around 450, but because of the successful rear action conducted by the
American left flank, only 3 1 prisoners were taken, most mortally wounded. 102 Though
the British took Breed's Hill that day, they lost Boston and removed their headquarters to
New York. The colonial soldiers were told to hold their fire until ordered to do so and to
aim for the officers. Though their muskets were inaccurate, the order to fire came at the
last possible moment and the death toll among British officers was staggering. Gen.
Howe lost his entire staff and some of his remaining officers begged Howe to pullback
i
no
and reevaluate the situation.
The results of the Battle of Bunker Hill were a combination ofNew England's
abilities to field forces capable on the battlefield (though perhaps not centrally organized
or properly supplied) and continued British prejudice against provincial armies.
According to Bernard Bailyn, Henry Clinton's suggestion to land the British behind
Breed's Hill would have been successful but was ignored by a cautious Howe. Though it
is quite probable that caution was a major factor in Howe's decision to land on Morton's
Point, over-confidence was the reason he continually ordered frontal assaults after he
failed to gain the American flank. Furthermore, that over-confidence would have been
warranted had the Americans acted in the manner assumed by the British. They did not,
however, and the defense conducted by Prescott was better than adequate. The
leadership at the regimental level and below resulted in prepared defensive positions,
high British casualties, especially among the officers, and a protected retreat.
The British
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officers' assumptions of colonial ineptitude, in the end, led the British Army to a victory
too costly to be repeated.
When he took over the revolutionary forces in 1775, George Washington was not
impressed with the caliber of officers and soldiers he found defending Boston. Yet
according to David Hackett Fischer in Washington 's Crossing, the new commander-in-
chief soon realized that there was merit in their methods and by the Battle of Trenton and
Princeton he was holding councils of war that encouraged autonomy in his regiments in
intelligence-gathering and led to a new "American Way of War". 1 "4 Of course this
statement ignores Grenier's formulation of America's "First Way of War" as an
incorporation of irregular tactics and violence; it does suggest an integration of
democratic military leadership found in New England with a more European ideal
favored by Washington to produce the Continental Army. Though there have been many
attempts in the recent historiography of the American past to discredit the idea of
exceptionalism, as Fischer states, "to make the American past into a record of. . . folly"
105
,
the evidence remains which illustrates the uniqueness of colonial American societies.
While it is undesirable to interpret our own history into a sort of iconographic
nationalism, it is equally egregious to impose our values in such a manner that we make
our past devoid of all accomplishment. New England society was the same as all
societies, unique. And it produced a military institution which reflected its values and so
was also unique. What can be argued as its "exceptional" quality was its successes
in the
face of professional scorn and its influence on a national stage
in its later history.
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